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Abstract
The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms
to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the imple-
mentation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves
between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on subsidies
to implement minimum market share requirements. Subsidies chosen
by the home government after firms have picked prices, create powerful
incentives for firms to raise prices - effects that are similar in nature to
those found with quotas/VERso We also show that firm-specific imple-
mentation of minimum market share targets is more anticompetitive
than aggregate industry-based enforcement.
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While policies to increase market access have received much attention in
recent years, scant attention has been paid to the issue of implementation of
these policies. Consider, for example, the persistent calls to 'open up' the
Japanese market by negotiating 'voluntary' minimum market share targets
for U.S. firms in Japan. Though there is still considerable debate about
the desirability of instituting such voluntary import expansions (VIEs), the
problem of implementation has never surfaced as being important. Irwin
(1994, pg. 65) notes that' ...the United States never seems concerned about
the mechanism by which "voluntary" bilateral agreements are carried out
and acts as if the foreign government can solve the problem by fiat.'
Since it is well understood that enforcement is critical to the success of
any results oriented policy, it is somewhat surprising that implementation per
se, has largely been ignored. While Ethier and Horn (1996) and Cronshaw
and Markusen (1995), among others, examine results oriented policies, Gre-
aney (1996a) specifically incorporates the problem of implementation in her
analysis. In her model, the government enforces the market share agreement
by threatening the home firm with a financial penalty in the event the im-
port target is not met. Nonetheless, neither this, nor other studies of VIEs,
examine alternative methods of implementing market share requirements. 1
In reality, there are a number of ways of implementing a market share re-
quirement, and the effects of the requirement depend critically on the details
of the implementation procedure used.
Understanding these effects is important, since unlike voluntary export
restraints (VERs) , no obvious procedure comes to mind for implementing
a VIE.2 An implementation procedure that is feasible for one market may
not be viable for another. For instance, setting minimum physical require-
ments on the use of imported intermediate goods may be a viable method
1See Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1990), Irwin (1994), Helpman and Krugman (1989),
Kowalczyk (1994), Bjorksten (1994) and Nakamura (1995). See Dumler (1996) and Gre-
aney (1996b) for mUlti-period analyses of VIE implementation.
2The use of quotas is an obvious way to implement a VER since the export-
ing/importing country's government can physically monitor the exact amounts of the
good leaving/entering the country, putting an end to the outflow/inflow the moment the
quantitative ceiling is reached.
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of implementation when the number of purchasing firms is small.3 Such an
implementation scheme would, however, be impossible to apply to the case of
a final good demanded by many small agents, and even when feasible, such
a mechanism may have undesirable effects.
In this paper, we examine the use of subsidies to enforce market share
requirements. While there are a number of instruments that could be used,
subsidies are feasible in a wide range of environments where direct control
is not.4 The subsidy schemes that we consider reveal the importance of the
sequence of moves between firms and the government, as well as whether the
market share requirement is specified on an industry or firm-specific basis. In
particular, we consider subsidies that are set before firms make their strategic
choices, as well as those which are imposed only if market outcomes violate
the market share requirement. In the latter case, we examine situations in
which firms know that a violation of the market share target will, with some
probability, trigger an import subsidy.5 .In our static model, this timing
assumption can be thought of as a way to capture multiperiod effects that
result from the dependence of policies on past market outcomes.6
The sequence of moves that we consider is motivated by some aspects
of the U.S.-Japan semiconductor VIE stipulating that U.S. firms achieve a
20 percent share in Japan's domestic chip market. Irwin (1994, pg. 55)
observes that ' ...MITI conducted extensive surveys of the purchasing plans
of all semiconductor users to monitor and to evaluate progress toward the 20
percent target.' This suggests that MITI could forecast, to some extent, what
the U.S. market share would be at the ruling prices, and, could, then, take
appropriate steps if it anticipated violation of the market share target. While,
according to Irwin (1994), in reality, MITI had to use ' ...moral suasion and
administrative guidance with the implicit (or perhaps even explicit) threat of
penalties... ' to coax Japanese buyers to purchase more U.S. semiconductors,
3Tyson (1992, pg. 111-112) suggests that this was what was done in the first semicon-
ductor agreement.
4As noted by Greaney (1996a), the Japanese government had no legal authority to
restrict Japanese sales, so that MITI was left with "moral suasion" or use of financial
instruments to provide incentives for firms to meet the target.
5This probabilistic structure is needed for technical reasons, but it also allows us to
capture aspects such as MITI's imperfect monitoring of the semiconductor VIE.
6Subsidy schemes with the timing we consider have been used in other contexts to
increase market share. For example, the U.S. government has used export subsidies as a
part of t he Export Enhancement Program, a program designed to increase the share of
U.S. wheat sales in the Egyptian market. See Goldberg and Knetter (1995) for an analysis.
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we examine what would have happened, had a direct financial instrument -
subsidies for U.S. products - been used to enhance demand for U.S. chips.
We show that a' timing framework where governments choose subsidy
levels to implement market share requirements after firms have made their
strategic decisions imparts incentive effects to subsidy policy that are sim-
ilar to those found with quotas/VERso . Such effects are absent from the
existing literature on subsidy policy which, with the exception of Carmichael
(1987) and Gruenspecht (1988), has consistently adhered to a timing struc-
ture where governments are first movers. 7 In keeping with that tradition,
Greaney (1996a) compares an import subsidy when the government moves
first, with a VIE (enforced by a penalty threat) when the government moves
second. She finds the two instruments have opposite effects on price, with
the VIE raising prices. Our analysis suggests that this distinction is some-
what misleading since a VIE can be enforced by an import subsidy, and if
the subsidy is triggered by a violation of the market share target, firms with
market power will have an incentive to raise price.
We also consider whether a subsidy triggered by a violation of the mar-
ket share requirement is less anticompetitive when it is implemented on a
firm-specific or industry-wide basis. This part of the analysis is motivated
by MITl's disenchantment with its firm-by-firm approach to enforcing the
1986 semiconductor agreement. Irwin (1994, pg. 55) notes that the process
' ...created so much tension between the industry and the government that
MITI officials later swore never to adopt such explicit market share targets
again.' Our analysis suggests that MITI would, in fact, have been better
off with an easier (less costly) method of enforcement! In particular, we
show that prices are higher when a market share requirement is enforced by
a firm-specific subsidy than when a uniform subsidy is imposed. The intu-
ition behind this result is that firms perceive themselves as subject to more
competition (i.e., more elastic demand) in the latter case.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze the use
of subsidies to enforce a VIE when governments can precommit to their poli-
cies, and we set the stage for our analysis of implementation when there are
problems with precommitment-i.e. governments move after firms. Section 3
7Carmichael (1987) is the first to investigate an alternative timing framework where
firms' pricing decisions precede the government's choice of export subsidy levels. Citing
evidence from practices followed by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to rationalize the se-
quence of government and firm actions, he shows that the rent seeking behavior of the
firms yields positive export subsidies in equilibrium.
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then identifies the kinds of incentive effects at work when governments are
second movers. In order to clearly isolate the incentive effects of a subsidy
on each of the firms; we first consider situations of one-sided market power
and, later, combine the analyses to study the case of two-sided market power.
When a subsidy on the U.S. product is used by the Japanese government to
implement a minimum market share target, the U.S. monopoly firm has an
incentive to raise price in order to trigger the subsidies. If monopoly power
is on the Japanese side, the incentives are for the Japanese firm to raise price
to reduce the amount of the subsidy granted or to eliminate it altogether.
We then put the two sides together and show that since price increases are
still matched by each firm, subsidies result in higher prices when firms have
market power. In SeCtion 4, we present a simple model to compare the in-
centive effects under an aggregate enforcement scheme with those under a
firm-specific scheme. Section 5 offers concluding comments.
2 Setting the Stage: Ex Ante versus Ex Post
Subsidies
While there may exist a number of different ways to implement market share
requirements, we focus on the instrument of a subsidy as a natural policy
to consider over a wide range of environments.8 Consider as an illustrative
example the case where the U.S. negotiates a market access requirement with
Japan. If a minimum market share for U.S. firms is the form of the market
access requirement, a reasonable way to implement it may be to subsidize
U.S. firms until their sales rise enough for the market share requirement to
be met.
The behavior of firms when faced with this kind of subsidy is very different
depending on whether they think and act like the level of the subsidy is given
to them, or whether they think and act like the subsidy can be affected by
their own behavior. In the former case, firms will not ask how changes in
their behavior will change the subsidies offered by the government. In the
latter case they will. The difference in the two cases can be thought of, at a
8Since taxes are also applicable in a wide range of environments, we have also examined
enforcement of a VIE by a tax levied on Japanese producers. While taxes and subsidies
have opposite price effects if they are imposed before firms make their strategic choices,
they have similar effects when applied ex post. Those results are available from the authors
upon request.
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formal level, as a difference in timing assumptions made. If the government
chooses its subsidy level first - what we call ex ante policy - then firms who
subsequently decide on their behavior must take the government's choices as
given. The government can look forward and take account of how its choices
affect the choices made by firms. If on the other hand, firms decide what
to do first, and then the government chooses its subsidy level - what we
call ex post policy - the government must take the firms' decisions as given
while firms look forward and take account of how their behavior affects the
government's behavior.
If subsidies are set ex ante, the analysis is straightforward. Whatever
be the market structure, the government looks forward and calculates the
subsidy on U.S. firms' which results in the market share requirement being
met. If, for example, there is a single foreign and a single domestic firm
competing in prices and producing differentiated goods that are substitutes
for one another, and if demand is linear, then the best response functions
of the U.S. firm B2(Pd, and the Japanese'firm B1(P2), can be depicted as
in Figure 1.9 The equilibrium firm (and consumer) prices are given by the
intersection of the best response functions, and their relative slopes are as
shown to ensure stability of equilibrium. The combination of consumer prices
which result in a market share for the U.S. firm at the free trade level can be
depicted by an upward sloping line EE, going through the equilibrium price
pair and lying between the two best response functions. 1o If a larger market
share for the U.S. is required by the market share rule, it can be depicted
by a line to the right of EE such as MM. This higher market share can be
attained by giving a subsidy per unit to the U.S. firm which moves its best
response function down and to the right through the point A.
Suppose, however, that the government is unwilling or unable to precom-
mit to the subsidy which gives A as the equilibrium outcome. One could
argue that it is, in fact, natural to expect problems with precommitment
in situations where governments resort to results-oriented (as opposed to
9As usual, the best response function for firm 1 (firm 2) is its profit maximizing price
given the price chosen by firm 2 (firm 1).
lOIn the case of linear demand, the locus of consumer price combinations (pf, pf) sat-
isfying a market share constraint of k (0 < k < 1) with equality is represented by the
. C C h l-k a,-ka\ l-k c+kb d h d d r
equatlOn P2 = Tlo + TllPl were TJo = l-k b+kc ' TIl = l-k)b+kc' an t e eman lOr
good i is qi(pf ,pf) = ai - bpf + cpr; b > c> 0, ai > 0; i = 1,2;] '" i. It is easy to verify
that this is the equation of a straight line steeper than 2's best response but flatter than
l's best response.
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instrument-oriented) policies. In these situations, there is considerable room
for strategic behavior by firms. For instance, a government may announce
that while it is serious about ensuring that the market share requirement
is met, it will not intervene actively unless free market forces continue to
v}qlate the market share targets. In such settings, firms can exploit the fact
that their actions influence the government's choice of policies. Much of the
concern in the real world about the effect of market share requirements has
to do with how their presence will influenGe the behavior of firms. Such issues
involve considerations of strategic interaction and cannot be analyzed within
the ex ante policy framework.
Indeed, this scenario seems to fit MITI's enforcement of the semiconduc-
tor agreement prior to 1992. The requirement that firms submit detailed
reports of their 1989 purchasing plans can be viewed as a signal of MITI's
intent to enforce the market share agreement. Nonetheless, the 20 percent
market share was not reached until the last quarter of 1992. By all accounts,l1
it was only after the failure to reach more than a 10 percent market share
by late 1989 that MITI increased its pressure tactics on firms. This example
may explain why Greaney (1996a) chose to analyze a VIE enforced by the
threat of a financial penalty rather than by an ex ante subsidy.12 MITI's
enforcement tactics also serve to motivate our analysis of ex post subsidies
and firm-specific versus industry-wide enforcement.
Before proceeding, two points are worth noting. First, Greaney's analysis
of a VIE and our analysism. omf an. ex post subsidy differ, not only in the
instrument used to enforce the market share target, but also .in the timing
of moves. In her model, a VIE is enforced by a penalty threat, but the
government moves only after market shares have been observed. Thus, the
VIE affects profits of the Japanese firm, but it does not affect the sales
of either firm or profits of the U.S. firm. As she notes in an unpublished
appendix, her timing is intended to reflect events during the last quarter of
1992 (when the 20 percent target was finally met). While our ex post subsidy
also involves the government moving second, we allow the government to set
the subsidy level after firms choose price, but before markets clear. Our
intent is to capture the monitoring and pressure tactics used by MITI during
the period 1989-1992. While it is tempting to model this process in a multi-
11 An unpublished appendix to Greaney's (1996a) paper is particularly clear on this
point. Similar points are also well documented by Irwin (1994) and Tyson (1992).
12While she examines an ex ante subsidy, she chooses not to interpret it as an instrument
for enforcing the VIE.
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period framework, we choose a static framework which is simple enough
to allow us to analyze, not only timing issues, but also firm-specific versus
industry-wide enforcement.
Second, the equilibrium one would observe under Greaney's VIE scheme
is represented by point C in Figure 1. Notice this is the equilibrium that
would result if the government were to levy an ex ante tax on the Japanese
firmP This equivalence occurs, in part, because the VIE leaves the U.S.
firm's behavior unchanged, an assumption which limits the scope for strate-
gic effects of policy. On the other hand, her scheme has the decided advantage
that the home government can implement the VIE with a minimum of in-
formation. In contrast, the ex post subsidies we consider impose substantial
informational requirements on the part of the government. 14 Thus, since the
government moves after firms set prices but before market shares are realized,
successful implementation necessitates, for instance, perfect information re-
garding the demand functions. However, the assumption that governments
face no informational constraints is not uncommon and characterizes most of
the literature on strategic trade policy, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1985).15
3 Ex Post Subsidies:
The easiest way to develop some intuition about how ex post policy, geared
towards implementing market share targets, affects firms' incentives is to
consider situations of one-sided market power, i.e., either the Japanese or
the U.S. firm has market power but not both. For simplicity, we assume that
demand is linear, products are differentiated, firms are risk neutral and that
the perfectly competitive firms make identical products. There are, then,
two simple combinations of policy regime and market structure considered
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2:
(a) Subsidy policy with a U.S. monopoly firm.and a competitive Japanese
industry,
(b) Subsidy policy with a Japanese monopoly firm and a competitive U.S.
13As the tax results in the Japanese firm setting a higher price for any given U.s. price,
this tax must move the Japanese firm's best response function to the right to go through
the point C.
14We are grateful to Theresa Greaney for pointing this out.
15See, also, Brainard and Martimort (1992) for a discussion of the high informational
requirements of strategic trade policy.
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industry.
These examples serve to show that even within such simple structures, ex
post subsidies create important incentive effects that are absent in their ex
ante counterparts. In Section 3.3, we put the two sides together.
3.1 Subsidy policy with a U.S. monopoly firm and a
competitive Japanese industry:
First consider the incentive effects under (a). Recall that the goods made
in the two countries are imperfect substitutes for each other and that the
Japanese industry is .behaving competitively and pricing at marginal cost.
The U.S. firm has monopoly power and has a first mover advantage over the
Japanese government. It understands that if it charges a price such that the
demand for its product at this price violates the market share constraint, it
will be given the subsidy per unit needed to meet the pre-specified market
share. In this situation, the U.S. firm has an incentive to raise price as
high as possible (to infinity) as there are no limits on its ability to exploit
the government. To make the problem bounded, we assume the Japanese
government announces that a violation of the market share target will, with
some probability, trigger a subsidy on the U.S. good.16 Uncertainty helps
to mitigate the U.S. firm's rent seeking incentives because, intuitively, some
degree of imprecision should reduce either firm's power to strategically exploit
the VIE target. This is trivially true for the U.S. firm in the case of a subsidy
because, under certainty, it has an incentive to charge an infinitely high
price. 17 The introduction of uncertainty also allows us to capture MITI's
imperfect monitoring of the VIE target in the semiconductor case and yields
equilibrium outcomes where the U.S. firm's market share can (ex post) fall
short of the mandated minimum (both of which are well documented in the
16This can limit the U.S. firm's rent-seeking ability since the incentive to charge an
arbitrarily high price is dampened by the small probability of getting the subsidy.
17 Further, even if an upper bound is placed on the U.S. firm's price, complete certainty
regarding that bound leads to excess strategic maneuvering by the Japanese firm when
there is two-sided market power. For instance, if we use the Carmichael (1987) type of
constraint where the subsidy is revoked with certainty whenever the U.S. firm prices above
its ordinary best response, the Japanese firm chooses its ordinary best response for U.S.
prices above the free trade level, but has an incentive to cut prices discontinuously for




Before proceeding to the formal analysis, some explanations regarding
notation are in order. In this case, the competitive Japanese firm price PI, is
always equivalent to the consumer price pf.I9 However, the U.S. consumer
price pf equals the firm price P2 only when the subsidy is not realized. Other-
wise, when the subsidy is triggered, pf equals 92(PI), where 92 (PI) is the U.S.
"'cbnsumer price that makes the market share constraint just bind, given the
Japanese firm price Pl' Hence, given firm prices, (PI,P2), demand for the U.S.
good is q2(PI,92(PI)) if the subsidy is invoked, and demand equals Q2(PI,P2)
if the subsidy is not granted. The locus of prices, (PI, 92 (PI)), traces out an
upward sloping line M M (shown in Figure 3), such that the market access
constraint is binding only for firm prices lying above (and to the left of) this
line.
Now, let f(PI,P2) be the probability of the subsidy being granted for any
given price combination above MM. Assume that f (.) is nondecreasing in
PI and nonincreasing in P2. 20 Then, given constant unit cost r2, for price
combinations (PI,P2) above M M, we can define the U.S. firm's expected
profits as
7r2(PI,P2) - f(,)(P2 - r2)Q2(PI,92(PI)) + [1 - f(,)](P2 - r2)Q2(pI,P2)
- f(·)7r!j(PbP2) + [1- f(·)] 7r2(PI,P2)
where 7r!j (PI, P2) is its profit at subsidized prices while 7r2(PI, P2) is its or-
dinary profit function. 7r!j(PbP2) and 7r2(PI,P2) are depicted in Figure 2.
Notice that for any given PI, 7r!j(PbP2) is represented by a straight line with
a constant positive slope of Q2(PI,92(PI)).21 Figure 2 also shows 7r2(PI,P2) for
the special case of a constant probability of subsidy.
18Both Irwin (1996) and Greaney (1996a) discuss the continual seesawing of the U.S.
market share below the 20 percent mark before finally climbing to just above the target
in the fourth quarter of 1992.
19Henceforth, Pi will always denote the price charged by firm i while the consumer price
will be represented by pf. Recall that firms in the competitive industry (Japanese firms, in
this case) are identical in every respect and, hence, when good i is competitively produced,
Pi refers to the price of the representative firm.
2oFor instance,we could use !(Pt. P2) = 1- h(P2 - g2(Pl)) where h E (0,1), and h' (.) ~ 0
since we know that g;(.) > O. Henceforth, for simplicity, we shall assume !(Pl,P2) to be a
constant.
2lGiven any Pl, Q2(Pl,g2(Pl)) is simply the demand for firm 2's product at the corre-
sponding point on the market share line MM. Q2(Pl,g2(pd) decreases continuously as Pl
increases and we move up along MM.
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Let B2(PI) denote the U.S. firm's ordinary best response in the absence
of a market share constraint. Define B2(Pl) as the interior maximizer of
1r2(PI,P2) which we ~ssume to be bounded and concave. If the market share
constraint is binding, the relevant profit function is 1r2(PI,P2)' On the other
hand, if the constraint is not binding, then the U.S. firm maximizes 1r2(PI,P2)
as before. As 1r2(PI,P2) = 1r2(PI,P2) at P2 = 92(PI), the overall profit function
is given by
7r2(PllP2) 1r2(PI,P2) for P2 ~ 92(Pl)
- 1r2(PI,P2) for P2 > 92(PI)
In Figure 2, the bold line traces out 7r2(PI,P2). Note that for prices to the
right of the P2 at which 7I"2(PI,P2) and 7r¥(PI,P2) intersect, the market share
constraint is violated and 1i'2(P1, P2) is the relevant profit for these prices.
Let the maximizer of 7r2(Pl,P2) be denoted by B2(PI)' Then, there are three
possibilities to consider when deriving the U.S. firm's overall best response.
Given the Japanese price pI, 1r2(') and 1r2(') may intersect at a P2 where
(i) both are increasing in P2, (ii) both are decreasing in P2, or (iii) 1r2(') is
decreasing and 1i'2(') is increasing in P2. Recall that at P2 = 92(PI), 1i'2(') =
1r2(') and 1i'2(') has a larger slope than 7I"2(')' Then, given the definition of
7r2(Pl,P2), we must have B2(PI) = B 2(Pd in case (i) and B2(Pd = B2(Pd
in case (ii). In case (iii), B2(PI) equals either B 2(PI) or B2(PI) depending
on whether the peak of 1i'2(') is higher or lower than that of 7I"2(')' Case
(i) occurs when B2(PI) > g2(PI), case (ii) corresponds to situations where
B 2(PI) < 92(Pl) while case (iii) occurs when B2(PI) < 92(PI) < B2(PI)' Note
that Figure 2 is representative of case (i).
Figure 3 shows B2(PI), B2(PI) and the market share line M M in price
space. Note that for PI less than R~ (the PI at which M M intersects B2(pd)
we are in case (i), while case (ii) corresponds to PI greater than R~' (the PI
at which M M intersects B 2(PI))' Case (iii) occurs for Japanese prices in the
intermediate range between R~and R~/. Hence, from the above analysis, we
may depict the overall U.S. best response, B2(PI), by the bold line in Figure
3 which assumes one switchover point R~ at which B2(PI) jumps down from
B 2 (PI) to B2 (PI).
Now, let R1 be any Japanese competitive price resulting in a free trade
equilibrium point A, unconstrained by any market share target. If the market
access requirement specifies a U.S. share greater than that in free trade, M M
must lie below B2(Pd at PI = R I, and so, RI must lie to the left of R~ in
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Figure 3. Clearly, this corresponds to case (i) and the U.S. firm maximizes
its profit by picking a price B 2 (Rd, resulting in the equilibrium at point C.
In equilibrium, there is a positive probability of a subsidy being granted and
the U.S. firm charges a higher price compared to free trade.
3.2 Subsidy policy with a Japanese monopoly firm and
a competitive U.S. industry:
Now, consider the incentive effects under (b) where the Japanese firm has
market power. Analogous to the previous case, given firm prices (PI,P2),
demand for the Japanese good is qi (PI, 92 (PI)) if the subsidy is invoked, and
demand equals qI(Pll'P2) if the subsidy is not granted. The Japanese firm
knows that if the market share requirement is not met, a subsidy will be
given, with some probability, to the U.S. firms. In this event, demand for
the Japanese firm's product will fall, along with its profit. If, however, the
Japanese firm were to raise its price, it could reduce or eliminate the subsidy
given to the U.S. firms, and at least get a higher price in return for a lower
demand. This is what creates incentives for price increases by the Japanese
firm even when the U.S. firms are pricing competitively.
Proceeding similarly to the previous case, for any U.S. firm price P2,
let 91 (P2) be the Japanese consumer price that satisfies the market share
constraint with equality. Then, given P2, unit cost 1'1 and the probability of
subsidy f(.), the Japanese firm's expected profit function for prices to the
left of M Mis:
7fI(pI,P2) - f(,)(Pi - 1'I)qI(PI,92(PI)) + [1 - f(,)](Pi - 1'I)qI(PI,P2)
- f(.)1ff(PI) + [1- f(.)]1fI(PI,P2)
1fI(PllP2) is the Japanese firm's ordinary profit function while 1ff(PI) is its
profit at the subsidized prices (PI, 92 (PI)), and equals its ordinary profit at
the corresponding point on the M M line. For a given P2, note that the first
derivative of 1ff(Pd is greater than that of 1fI(PI,P2) at PI = 9I(P2), i.e.,
on the M M line, since demand at the subsidized prices is more inelastic
than ordinary demand. Since 7f1(PI, P2) is a convex combination of 1ff (PI)
and 1fl(PI,P2) and f(.) is constant, the derivative of '7rI(PI,P2) must also be
greater than that of 1fI(PI,P2).22 Figure 4 depicts 1ff(PI), assumed concave,




The Japanese firm's overall profit function is given by
7r1(PI,P2) = 7r1(PI>P2) for PI ~ 91(P2)
= 7f1(PI,P2) for PI < 91 (P2)
7r1(PI,P2) is shown as the bold curve in Figure 4. Note that, now, for
prices less than the PI at which 7rf(PI) and 7r1(PI,P2) intersect, the market
share constraint is violated and 7r1 (PI, P2) is the relevant profit. Let.81(P2)
be the maximizer of 7r1(PI,P2). Again, we have three cases to consider in
deriving the Japanese firm's overall best response. Given U.S. price P2, 7r1(')
and "7i\ (.) may intersect at a PI where (i) both are increasing in PI, (ii) both
are decreasing in PI> or (iii) 7r1(') is decreasing and 7r1(') is increasing in Pl'
Then, from the definition of 7r1(PI, P2), we must have .81(P2) = B I(P2) in case
(i) and .81(P2) = B I (P2) in case (ii). In case (iii), .81(P2) equals 91 (P2), i.e., the
Japanese firm prices along MM. Case (i) occurs when B I (P2) > 91(P2), case
(ii) corresponds to situations where B I (P2) < 91 (P2) while case (iii) occurs
when B I(P2) < 91(P2) < B I(P2). Figure 4 corresponds to the situation in
case (ii).
Now, consider Figure 5 which shows B I(P2), B I(P2) and the market share
line M M in price space. As drawn, the Japanese firm's profit, as we move up
along M M, increases up to the point D (where an iso-profit curve is tangent
to M M) and then decreases. For U.S. prices less than ~ (the P2 at which
M M intersects B1(P2)) we are in case (i) and the best response is to choose
B I (P2)' For P2 greater than R; (the P2 on M M corresponding to the price
R~ which maximizes 7rf(PI)), we are in case (ii) and the Japanese firm is
best off pricing along B I(P2). Note that for P2 ~ R;' (the P2 at which B I(P2)
intersects R~), B I(P2) must lie to the left of B I(P2). Finally, for prices in the
intermediate range between ~ and R;, 7r1(PI,P2) is decreasing in PI while
7rf(Pd is increasing in PI at 91 (P2)' Hence, 7r1 (.) may be increasing - case
(iii) with .81~) = 91(P2) - or decreasing - case (ii) with .81(P2) = B I (P2).
Since 7r1(') is a convex combination of 7r1 (PI ,P2) and 7rf(PI), it is likely to
be increasing for prices close to ~ but is likely to be decreasing for prices
close to R;. This, in turn, suggests that .81 (P2) lies along the M M line
for prices close to R~ and lies on B 1(P2) for prices close to R;. The overall
Japanese best response depicted by the bold line in Figure 5 is drawn under
the assumption that B I (P2) intersects M M at prices (R I , R2 ).
In Figure 5, suppose the U.S. good is priced competitively at R2 and the
market share target is greater than the free trade level. Then at R2 , M M
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must lie to the right of B1(P2) and must intersect B1(P2)' at some point E
as depicted. We are then in case (ii) and the Japanese firm prices along
B1(P2) resulting in ~n equilibrium at point C. Compared to the free trade
equilibrium at A, the ex post subsidy policy yields a higher Japanese price
and a (stochastically) lower consumer price for the U.S. good. 23
3.3 Ex Post Policy with Two-Sided Market Power:
The effect of two-sided market power can be thought of as combining the ele-
ments of the analysis so far. If, for example, we consider the implementation
of a minimum market share using a subsidy on the U.S. firm, then two-sided
market power can be' thought of as superimposing the best response of a
U.S. firm having market power, case (a) and Figure 3 above, on the best re-
sponse function of a Japanese firm having market power, case (b) and Figure
5 above. This is done in Figure 6 where the best responses for the Japanese
and U.S. firms are labelled B1(P2) and B2(Pl) respectively. When the U.S.
firm alone exercises market power it has an incentive to raise prices in the
hope of triggering subsidies. On the other hand, when the power is on the
Japanese side, there is an incentive to increase prices to reduce the amount
of the subsidy, as well as to receive a higher price for its product should the
demand lowering subsidy occur. Since price increases are still matched by
each firm (strategic complements), putting both the sides together results in
higher prices compared to the free trade equilibrium.
4 Aggregate vs. Firm-specific Implementa-
tion
This section examines the economic effects of a market access requirement
that can be enforced by either firm-specific targets or by aggregate industry-
based targets. Consider a VIE mandating that U.S. firms together achieve
at least a k% share of a designated Japanese market. One way to enforce
such a requirement is to use firm-specific subsidies that ensure a minimum
~% market share for each of the n (symmetric) U.S. firms in that market.
Alternatively, the Japanese government can opt for a uniform subsidy that
23Ifthe competitive U,S, price lies between ~ and R2, the ex post subsidy policy results
in an unchanged U,S, price, a higher Japanese price and a zero subsidy in equilibrium.
14
is designed to yield an aggregate k% U.S. market share at the subsidized
prices. The natural question that then arises is, which of these two schemes
- aggregate or firm-specific - is better? When the government moves first, no
such issue arises, but when firms move first, the distinction can be important.
We address this question in the simplest possible extension of the model in
section 3.1 by considering a competitive Japanese sector pricing at marginal
cost and two U.S. firms choosing prices P2 and P3, respectively. To keep
the analysis simple, we also assume a constant probability () of the subsidy
being instituted when the VIE target is violated. In this setting, we show
that an aggregate scheme always dominates a firm-specific scheme in that
implementing a VIE with an aggregate market share-based instrument yields
lower prices compared' to firm-specific enforcement.
The intuition behind this is best grasped by considering the symmetric
case where both the aggregate and the firm-specific market share constraints
are just binding. First consider subsidies based on the aggregate U.S. market
share. If one of the U.S. firms, say firm 2, increases its price by $1.00, a sub-
sidy of $0.50 to both the U.S. firms is needed to regain the initial aggregate
U.S. market share. Thus, firm 2's $1.00 price hike under the aggregate sub-
sidy increases its own consumer price by $0.50 and reduces firm 3's consumer
price by $0.50, thereby resulting in a decrease in the quantity demanded of
firm 2's product. However, note that this reduction in firm 2's demand is less
than that which would have occurred if there had been no subsidy policy at
all, i.e., firm 2's perceived elasticity of demand for price increases under the
aggregate market share subsidy is less than its ordinary elasticity of demand.
Thus aggregate market share subsidies reduce the intensity of competition
and tend to raise prices. What about firm-specific market share subsidies?
Now, a $1.00 increase in firm 2's price must be matched by a $1.00 subsidy
to itself with no subsidy to the other U.S. firm in order to maintain firm
2's individual market share. In other words, under firm-specific enforcement,
firm 2's demand when the subsidy is granted remains unchanged for own
price increases! Thus, each firm's demand is completely inelastic for price
increases under the individual scheme leading to an even greater reduction
in the intensity of competition. This is what creates the incentives for higher
prices when enforcement is carried out on a firm-by-firm basis relative to
aggregate industry based implementation.24
24This suggests that the difference between the effects of the aggregate and firm-specific
schemes will be greater, the larger the number of firms.
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4.1 Aggregate Market Share Subsidies
First, consider the implementation of a market share VIE with an aggregate
market share subsidy. As in section 3.1, PI denotes the price of the compet-
itively produced Japanese product. However, now, we have two U.S. firms
- firm 2 and firm 3 - choosing prices P2 and P3, respectively. The goods are
symmetric substitutes and own price effects are assumed to outweigh cross
price effects. In this setting, the government announces that whenever it
anticipates violation of the aggregate market share target ql(J1J2~jl~(.) ~ k,
it will, with probability B, grant to both the U.S. firms the per unit subsidy
s(.) necessary to satisfy the aggregate market share constraint. The question
is, how does this enf0rcement based on aggregate market shares affect the
firms' strategic behavior?
Let 92(P3) be the consumer price for good 2 that makes the aggregate
constraint just bind. Note that the Japanese price PI is also an argument in
92~) but since this price is always fixed at the level of marginal cost, we are
dropping it for purposes of notational ease. It should be kept in mind that
this is the convention we shall follow throughout the analysis. (92 (P3), P3)
traces out a downward sloping aggregate market share line M M in U.S.
firms' price space, as shown in Fig. 7. This follows from the fact that an
increase in one U.S. firm's price must be matched by an equal decrease in
the other U.S. firm's price in order to keep the aggregate U.S. market share
unchanged. U.S. prices above and to the right of M M violate the aggregate
market share constraint. Hence, the free trade point F (in Fig. 7) at which
the firms' ordinary best responses B2(P3) andB3(P2) intersect must lie to the
right of M M because, by assumption, the constraint is binding under free
trade.
Now, consider any P3, say P3, and let firm 2 violate the aggregate con-
straint by charging a price P2 > 92(P3) above the M M line. If only 2 were
to receive the subsidy then, similar to the monopoly case, the requisite sub-
sidy would be the one needed to pull 2's consumer price down to 92(P3),
the corresponding point on MM. However, since the subsidy, when invoked,
is granted to both firms, it must be less than this amount and must yield
consumer prices (Pf,pf) given by (P2 - S(.),P3 - s(.)) on MM to the left of
(92(P3),P3'). For instance, in the linear case shown in Fig. 7, for P3 = F3,
if 2 charges P2 = F21 the aggregate market share subsidy would result in
consumer prices at point E to the left of G. Hence, starting from any point
on M M, an increase in 2's price results in a less than proportionate increase
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in the subsidy that it (and its rival, too) stochastically receives.25 Unlike the
monopoly case where the U.S. monopoly's demand remains unchanged when
the subsidy is given,· here, violating the constraint reduces firm 2's demand
with the subsidy (though by less than that in the absence of the subsidy).
Let us, now, derive firm 2's best response under the aggregate scheme.
Assuming a common constant marginal cost of r for both U.S. firms, firm
2's ordinary profit is 7f2(P2,P3) = (P2 - r)Q2(P2,P3) while its profit with the
subsidy is 7fi(P2,P3) = (P2 - r)Q2(P2 - S(.),P3 - s(.)) It understands that s(.)
will be given with probability () whenever P2 > 92(P3). Hence, its expected
profit is a convex combination of its ordinary profit and its profit with a
subsidy, i.e.,
Firm 2's overall profit is then given by
7T2(P2,P3) - 7f2(P2,P3) for P2 ~ 92(P3)
7r2(P2,P3) for P2 > 92(P3)
Examining the shape of firm 2's profit with a subsidy, we find that
which reduces to
Now, since o~~) > 0, own price effects are larger than cross effects, and
7fi (.) = 7f2(') when P2 = 92(P3), we get &rrJ~') > &rra;~.) along the market
share line MM. There are, then, only three possible cases to consider: (i)
&rrf(.) > &rr2(.) > 0 (.. ) &rrf(.) > 0 > &rr2(.) d (... ) 0 > Chrf{·) > Chr2(.) Th
&P2 01>2 - , 11 &P2 - &P2 ' an , III 01>2 0P2' e
first case is depicted in Fig.8(i) where both ordinary profit 7f2(') and profit
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with subsidy 7ri(.) are shown to be rising at their intersection point. Since
expected profit 7f2 (.) is a convex combination of the two, it must also be rising
at 92 (P3)' Firm 2's overall profit function is shown as the bold curve. Let
us denote the maximizers of 7r2(')' 7ri(.), 7r2(') and 7r2(.) by B2~), Bf(P3),
B2(P3) and B2(P3), respectively. Then, clearly, from Fig. 8(i), we must have
B2(P3) = B2(P3) and firm 2 charges a price that maximizes its expected
profit. Note that this price is greater than its ordinary best response B2(P3).
This case occurs for large P3 for which firm 2's ordinary best response violates
the aggregate constraint. As P3 falls we move into the second case as depicted
in Fig. 8(ii). Here firm 2 compares its profit from its ordinary best response
with that from charging B2~) and picks the one yielding a higher profit.
For even lower P3, we get the third case shown in Fig. 8(iii) where it is clear
that 2's overall best response must be to pick its ordinary best response, i.e.,
we must have B2~) = B2(P3).
Assuming a unique switch-over point at which firm 2 switches from pricing
along B2~) to charging its ordinary best response B2(P3), and noting that
firm 1's strategic behavior must be exactly symmetric, we get a pure strategy
equilibrium. This is depicted in Fig. 9 by the point K where the firms'
overall best responses intersect above the market share line. Note that each
firm charges a price greater than its free trade price and a positive subsidy
is given with probability ().
4.2 Firm-specific Market Share Subsidies
Let us, now, turn to the case of firm-specific enforcement of a market share
VIE. Recall that satisfaction of the VIE target requires that ()1.)<Tl.) () 2::ql· Q2· Q3·
k. Clearly, if each U.S. firm's individual share of the market were greater
than k/2 the VIE target would be met. However, satisfaction of the ag-
gregate market share constraint does not necessarily imply satisfaction of
each firm's individual market share constraint. For U.S. firm i, i = 2,3, let
Ql(.)+:U+Q3(.) 2:: k/2 be referred to as firm i's individual constraint. Suppose
the government announces that whenever it anticipates violation of either or
both U.S. individual constraints it will stochastically give subsidies 82(') and
83(') to firms 2 and 3, respectively, such that each U.S. firm achieves an indi-
vidual market share of at least k/2. How does this firm-specific enforcement
scheme affect the firms' incentives?
The analysis is complicated by the fact that 82 (.) and 83 (.) vary across
different regions depending upon whether only one or both individual con-
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straints are violated. For any P3, define h2(P3) as the consumer price for which
2's individual market share constraint is just met without government inter-
vention. Observe th~t firm 2's individual share of the market ( )+Q2(.) + ()qt· Q2{.) '13.
decreases in own price but increases with an increase in firm 3's price. Hence,
starting from any point where 2's individual constraint is just met, an in-
crease in P3 must be matched by an increase in P2 to get its market share back
to k/2. Thus, h2(P3) and, symmetrically, h3(P2) are positively sloped. Fig.
10 illustrates the individual constraint lines for the case of linear demand.
These individual market share constraint lines partition the price space
into four different regions. Region Rl, defined by P3 ::; h3(P2) and P2 ::;
h2~), has both firms charging low prices such that both individual con-
straints are met and rio subsidies are needed. Note that in this region where
both the market share constraints are satisfied, the aggregate market share
must also be met. In region R2, we have P3 ~ h3(P2) and P2 ~ h2~) such
that high prices are set by both firms, and, interior points violate both the
constraints. From Fig. 10, it can be seen that the requisite subsidies in this
region must result in consumer prices (E2 , E3 ) defined by the intersection of
the individual constraints. Region R3, with P3 ::; h3(P2) and P2 ~ h2(P3)
has firm 3 pricing low and firm 2 pricing high such that only 2's individual
constraint is violated. Analogously, in region ~, defined by P3 ~ h3 (P2) and
P2 ::; h2(P3), only firm 3's constraint is violated.
Consider firm 2's best response under firm-specific market share subsi-
dies. To keep matters simple, we shall sketch out an intuitive and graphical
explanation of the incentive effects under firm-specific subsidies. Consider
Fig. 10 and let firm 3 charge a low price such that P3 ::; E 3 . In this case, firm
2 has the incentive to charge a high price (in region R3 ) that violates only
its individual constraint so that only 2 receives the subsidy stochastically.
In this region, similar to the monopoly case, the subsidy pulls 2's consumer
price down to that on its individual constraint line yielding a demand of
Q2(P3, h2(P3)). Hence, its profit with the subsidy increases continuously in its
own price at a constant rate, and, as in the monopoly case, its best response
is to charge a price greater than its ordinary best response because expected
profit (a convex combination of ordinary profit and profit with the subsidy)
is increasing at P2 = B2(P3). It should be easy to see that this strategy
dominates choosing a price in region R1 (where no subsidies are required) or
R4 (where only firm 3 gets a subsidy).
What about the case where 3 charges a high price, i.e., when P3 > E3?
First, note that if 2 charges a low price with P2 ::; E2 we are in region R4
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where only 3's individual constraint is violated and only it has a positive
probability of getting a subsidy. The requisite subsidy here would lower 3's
consumer price to the corresponding point on h3 (P2) and would result in 2's
profit with the subsidy being equal to its ordinary profit at this point. Since
this profit is increasing in P2 as we move up along 3's individual constraint
line and since 2's ordinary profit is also increasing in this region, its expected
profit must be increasing in own price such that firm 2 will never have the
incentive to charge such a low price. So, 2 must set a price greater than E2 .
Next, note that when P2 > E2 , regardless of whether (P2,PJ) falls in region
R4 , R2 , or R3 , consumer prices with subsidies must always equal (E2 , E3 ).
This occurs because for P2 > E2 and P3 > E3 , even when only one individual
constraint is violated' (in region R3 or R4 ), the subsidy required to satisfy
only that specific constraint results in consumer prices lying in R2 where both
constraints are violated. Thus, only subsidies resulting in consumer prices
(E2 , E3 ) are feasible. In other words, firm 2's profit with a subsidy increases
at a constant rate, as shown in Fig. 11, and its best response is to charge
the price that maximizes its expected profit.
Combining the above analyses, we can depict the best responses as shown
in Fig. 12 with the symmetric equilibrium at point L. Note that, in equilib-
rium, each firm charges a higher price compared to free trade.
4.3 Comparison of Aggregate and Firm-specific Schemes
The aggregate scheme yields lower prices than the firm-specific scheme. This
is depicted in Fig. 13 where the superscripts a and f refer to the aggregate
and firm-specific schemes, respectively. The reasoning for this result is as
follows. Consider K = (K2 , K 3 ), the equilibrium under aggregate market
share subsidies and let P3 = K3 • Then, we already know that P2 = K2
maximizes firm 2's expected profit under the aggregate scheme. Observe
that at these prices firm 2's profits from subsidies are equal under either
scheme, i.e., 7ria(K2 , K3 ) = 7ri'(K2 , K3 ). This property holds for all prices
on the 45-degree diagona1.26 Since ordinary profits 7r~(K2, K3 ) = 7r{ (K2 , K3 )
always holds, expected profits (a convex combination of ordinary and subsidy-
ridden profits) are also equal at these prices. However, since the firm-specific
subsidy profit 7ri' (K2 , K3) increases more steeply than 7ria(K2 , K3 ), firm
2's expected profit must still be rising at P2 = K 2 implying that its best
260bviously, this would not be the case if the Japanese price changed.
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response is to charge a price higher than K 2 • Thus, 13{(K3 ) > K 2 must
hold. The reasonin~ for the other U.S. firm proceeds analogously such that
in equilibrium firm-specific subsidies must yield higher prices compared to
aggregate market share subsidies.
5 Conclusion:
The U.S. preoccupation with negotiating minimum market share targets with
the Japanese government has raised many questions regarding the economic
consequences of these targets. However, recent work to analyze these ques-
tions has paid little attention to the implementation aspect, even though it
is well understood that enforcement is critical to the success of any results-
oriented policy. This paper explicitly considers subsidy instruments to imple-
ment minimum market share agreements and demonstrates that their effects
depend critically on the sequence of moves between government and firms.
In particular, when the home government can move only after firms have
made their strategic choices (ex post policy), these subsidies create powerful
incentives for firms to raise prices - incentive effects that are absent in the
traditional ex ante timing framework.
Under subsidy policy with monopoly power on the U.S. side, the incen-
tives are for the U.S. firm to raise price and trigger the subsidies. If monopoly
power is on the Japanese side, the incentives are for the Japanese firm to try
and ensure that the subsidies are not triggered since such an occurrence low-
ers sales without a compensatory high price. Thus, it raises price to prevent
subsidies (and reduce their amount) to the U.S. firms. In either case, under
the ex post timing structure, subsidies create incentives to raise prices.
The same types of effects can be shown to occur if the minimum import
requirement is implemented by an ex post tax on the Japanese good. If mar-
ket power is on the U.S. side, then the incentives are for the U.S. firm to
raise its price, triggering taxes on the Japanese good, which in turn enhances
demand for the U.S. firm's product and increases its profit. If power is on
the Japanese side, then the incentive is always to prevent taxes from being
invoked by charging higher prices. Here, too, a timing structure with govern-
ment as second mover produces incentives that result in higher prices. Thus,
both tax and subsidy schemes, in the presence of market power, are anticom-
petitive in their effects. These incentive effects, while well documented for
quotas/VERs, are not found in the literature on tax/subsidy policy.
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As shown in Section 4, these anticompetitive effects are mitigated to some
extent if the government's enforcement is not done on a firm-by-firm basis.
While our analysis of this issue focused on subsidies when there is more than
one U.S. firm, similar results can be shown when the VIE is implemented
by taxing Japanese firms. In particular, when the U.S. industry is perfectly
competitive and there is more than one Japanese producer, a uniform ex
post tax on Japanese firms will raise prices less than a firm-specific tax.
With both subsidies and taxes, firm-by-firm enforcement lessens competition
to the extent that it lowers firms' perceived demand elasticities.
Finally, given the anticompetitive nature of the tax and subsidy instru-
ments considered so far, the natural question that arises is: 'are there situa-
tions in which an import target can be implemented without raising prices?'
While this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, situations in which this
is possible are examined elst:where by Krishna, Roy and Thursby (1996) and
Krishna and Morgan (1996)
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